

Zero Trust Architectures for Edge-Native AI Inference Systems

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Siddharth Verma

Independent Researcher

Lucknow, India (IN) – 226001



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ABSTRACT

Edge-Native AI Inference Systems (ENAIS) are rapidly proliferating across domains such as autonomous vehicles, smart manufacturing, healthcare diagnostics, and critical infrastructure monitoring. By bringing AI inference closer to data sources, ENAIS dramatically reduce latency, conserve bandwidth, and enable real-time decision-making. However, the shift from centralized cloud environments to widely distributed, resource-constrained edge nodes introduces unique security challenges: traditional perimeter defenses become ineffective, attack surfaces multiply, and heterogeneity complicates policy enforcement. To address these concerns, this manuscript presents a comprehensive Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) tailored for ENAIS. Building on the principle of “never trust, always verify,” our design integrates three core components: identity-centric access controls, micro-segmentation of inference pipelines, and continuous telemetry-driven policy adaptation. We detail the architectural blueprint, describe its implementation within a simulation framework, and

conduct a rigorous evaluation under realistic threat scenarios. Statistical analysis of the simulation data—covering metrics such as unauthorized access prevention, inference latency, and resource overhead—reveals that the proposed ZTA blocks over 98% of unauthorized actions while incurring only a modest 16.6% latency penalty and minimal CPU and network overhead. These results demonstrate that ZTA can substantially elevate the security posture of ENAIS without compromising real-time performance requirements. We conclude with a discussion of deployment considerations, potential integration with federated learning, and directions for future work in securing next-generation edge AI.

KEYWORDS

Zero Trust, Edge Computing, AI Inference, Micro-Segmentation, Continuous Authentication

INTRODUCTION

Edge computing has fundamentally transformed how AI workloads are deployed and consumed. By shifting inference tasks from centralized cloud servers to

decentralized edge devices—ranging from industrial controllers and smart cameras to autonomous drones—organizations can achieve sub-millisecond response times, reduce network congestion, and maintain service continuity in intermittent-connectivity scenarios (Shi et al., 2016; Satyanarayanan, 2017). In mission-critical applications such as collision avoidance in autonomous vehicles or anomaly detection in manufacturing lines, these performance gains are indispensable. Yet, as inference pipelines migrate to the network edge, the very features that enable performance improvements also exacerbate security risks.

trust within the environment, require continuous verification of identity and posture, and enforce least-privilege access at every layer (Rose et al., 2020). While ZTA has gained traction in cloud and enterprise networks, its application to edge AI inference remains nascent. This manuscript aims to bridge that gap by:

1. **Defining Security Requirements:** We analyze ENAIS use cases to identify the unique constraints—intermittent connectivity, resource limits, heterogeneity—that any ZTA must address.

Enhancing Edge AI Security with Zero Trust




Figure-1. Enhancing Edge AI Security with Zero Trust

Edge nodes often operate in untrusted, physically accessible environments, may lack hardware security modules, and host diverse AI accelerators with varying software stacks. The result is an expanded attack surface encompassing everything from supply-chain attacks on model binaries to inference-time adversarial manipulations (Garcia et al., 2021; Park et al., 2020). Traditional perimeter-based security models—where a well-defended corporate network edge protects an inner “trusted” zone—are ill-suited to such distributed infrastructures. Compromise of any single edge device can cascade, enabling lateral movement and broader system infiltration. Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) offers a compelling alternative: explicitly eliminate implicit

Zero Trust Secures Edge AI




Figure-2. Zero Trust Secures Edge AI

2. **Proposing a Tailored ZTA:** We design an architecture combining OAuth 2.0-based device and service authentication, containerized micro-segmentation, and a lightweight policy engine capable of operating on constrained hardware.
3. **Validating via Simulation:** We implement the ZTA in OMNeT++ with INET, modelling 50 edge nodes, and subject the system to realistic adversarial scenarios. Performance and security metrics are collected and statistically analyzed.
4. **Evaluating Trade-Offs:** We quantify the security benefits—blocking over 98% of unauthorized actions—against the performance overhead—16.6% added latency and ~15% resource increases—to demonstrate the practical viability of ZTA for ENAIS.

5. **Charting Future Directions:** We discuss challenges in real-world deployment, integration with federated learning workflows, and extension to adaptive threat intelligence sharing across edge clusters.

By rigorously exploring design, implementation, and evaluation, our work offers both a blueprint and empirical evidence that Zero Trust can secure the next generation of edge-native AI applications.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Edge-Native AI Inference Systems

Edge-Native AI Inference Systems (ENAIIS) refer to architectures where pre-trained machine learning models execute directly on edge devices, minimizing round-trip communication to cloud data centers. Early visions of edge AI focused on lightweight computer vision tasks on smartphones; contemporary trends encompass specialized hardware accelerators (NPUs, TPUs, FPGAs) embedded in sensors, gateways, and industrial controllers (Shi et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2022). Benefits include sub-10 ms inference times, off-grid operation, and reduced data transmission costs—critical for applications such as video analytics in smart cities, predictive maintenance in factories, and medical diagnostics in remote clinics. However, the heterogeneity of hardware platforms complicates software compatibility and standardization, while constrained compute and memory resources limit the complexity of deployable models.

Security Challenges in ENAIIS

Edge deployments face a spectrum of threats:

- **Model Theft & Tampering:** Attackers with physical or remote access can exfiltrate proprietary model binaries or inject malicious weights (Garcia et al., 2021).

- **Adversarial Attacks:** Carefully crafted inputs can cause misclassification or data poisoning, undermining system integrity (Goodfellow et al., 2015).

- **Side-Channel & Physical Attacks:** Lack of hardware root of trust makes edge devices vulnerable to voltage glitching, electromagnetic analysis, and other side-channel exploits (Park et al., 2020).

- **Lateral Movement:** Once an edge node is compromised, attackers can leverage trust relationships to move laterally across the network, escalating privileges and compromising additional nodes.

Traditional defenses—VPNs, VLANs, and static ACLs—are brittle in the face of such dynamic risks, particularly when devices join and leave the network frequently or connect over untrusted networks.

Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) Principles

Zero Trust dispenses with any notion of implicit trust based on network location or device ownership. Instead, it enforces:

1. **Strict Identity Verification:** Every user, device, and service must authenticate—ideally to least-privilege scopes—before any access is granted.
2. **Micro-segmentation:** Networks and workflows are subdivided into granular security zones; east-west traffic is filtered by policy.
3. **Continuous Monitoring & Analytics:** Telemetry from endpoints informs dynamic policy adjustments; anomalous behavior triggers re-authentication or quarantine.
4. **Adaptive Policy Enforcement:** Access decisions leverage risk scores that incorporate context (e.g., device posture, geolocation,

historical behavior).

NIST SP 800-207 codifies these principles for enterprise and cloud environments, but edge deployments require adaptations to account for limited connectivity, compute, and power budgets (Rose et al., 2020; Lin et al., 2021).

Prior Work on Edge Security and ZTA

Several studies have proposed trust models and secure channel protocols for edge AI:

- **Lightweight Trust Frameworks** (Jing et al., 2022) use local attestations to bootstrap trust among edge peers.
- **Microservice-based Policy Enforcement** (Kumar et al., 2022) employs containerized sidecars to enforce network policies—though not in a unified ZTA context.
- **Secure Communication Protocols** (Li et al., 2022) design low-overhead encryption and handshake schemes for resource-constrained devices, but lack integrated identity management.
- **Federated Learning Security** examines how to protect model updates during decentralized training (Xie et al., 2023), a related but distinct problem from inference security. Despite these advances, no prior work synthesizes identity, micro-segmentation, and telemetry-driven policy into a cohesive ZTA tailored for ENAIS. Our contribution fills this gap by presenting an end-to-end architecture validated under realistic threat models.

METHODOLOGY

Architectural Overview

Our ZTA for ENAIS is structured around three interacting layers (see Figure 1):

1. Identity & Access Management (IAM)

- **Device & Service Authentication:** We extend OAuth 2.0 client credentials flow with mutual TLS (mTLS) for initial authentication between edge nodes and the central policy controller. Each node holds a unique certificate issued by a private PKI.
- **Dynamic Risk Scoring:** A lightweight agent on each node collects posture data—OS version, patch levels, running process hashes—and computes a real-time risk score using a local ruleset. Certificates carry embedded risk claims that the policy engine evaluates at each access request.

2. Micro-segmentation

- **Containerized Pipeline Components:** Each inference stage—data ingestion, preprocessing, model execution, postprocessing—is packaged in an isolated Docker container.
- **Software-Defined Perimeter (SDP):** An SDP gateway enforces east-west policies: containers communicate only with explicitly authorized peers. Policies are pushed from the central controller as signed JSON.

3. Continuous Monitoring & Analytics

- **Telemetry Collection:** Edge agents stream metrics (CPU load, GPU utilization, network flows, anomalous syscalls) via a lightweight message bus (MQTT).
- **Anomaly Detection:** A central analytics cluster runs unsupervised models (e.g., isolation forests) to detect deviations from baseline behavior. Detected anomalies trigger policy

hardening (e.g., revoking tokens, tightening ACLs).

Simulation Framework

We implemented the architecture in OMNeT++ leveraging the INET framework for network modelling and Docker-in-Docker for container emulation. The testbed comprises 50 edge nodes, each hosting a ResNet-50 image classifier. Network topologies include mesh and star configurations to assess policy propagation under different connectivity patterns.

Threat Scenarios

We evaluated three adversarial models:

1. **Credential Replay:** An attacker captures valid tokens and attempts replay from a compromised node.
2. **Lateral Movement:** After gaining initial access, the attacker probes east-west interfaces to access other pipeline stages.
3. **Policy Tampering:** The attacker tries to modify or replay outdated policy snapshots to bypass micro-segmentation rules.

Metrics & Data Collection

For each scenario, we collected:

- **Unauthorized Access Attempts Blocked (%)**
- **End-to-End Inference Latency (ms)**
- **CPU & GPU Utilization (%)**
- **Network Overhead (kB per request)**
- **Policy Update Propagation Delay (ms)**

We ran each scenario for 10,000 inference requests under mixed benign/adversarial load (80:20 ratio), repeating experiments five times to compute means and standard deviations.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Table 1. Comparative Performance and Security Metrics for Baseline vs. ZTA-Enabled Deployments

Metric	Baseline	ZTA-Enabled	Observed Change (%)
Unauthorized Access Blocked	32	98	+206.3
Inference Latency (ms)	45.2	52.7	+16.6
CPU Utilization (%)	60.3	68.9	+14.2
Network Overhead (kB per request)	1.2	1.5	+25.0
Policy Propagation Delay (ms)	N/A	120	—




Figure-3. Comparative Performance and Security Metrics for Baseline vs. ZTA-Enabled Deployments

In the ZTA-enabled setup, blocked unauthorized attempts rose from 32% to 98% ($p < 0.001$), demonstrating a statistically significant security improvement. Latency increased by 7.5 ms on average—well within acceptable bounds for real-time ENAIS (<100 ms) (Satyanarayanan, 2017). CPU utilization saw a modest 8.6% rise, and network overhead increased by 25% due to telemetry streams and policy checks. Policy propagation delays averaged 120 ms, indicating rapid dissemination of policy updates even under mesh topologies.

SIMULATION RESEARCH

To mirror real-world edge conditions, our simulation modeled intermittent connectivity (10% random link failures per minute) and heterogeneous hardware profiles (varying CPU/GPU capabilities). Under these constraints, the ZTA maintained robust security enforcement: despite link outages, cached policy tokens allowed continued operation, with agents falling back to local risk evaluations when disconnected. Attackers attempting credential replay were thwarted by short-lived tokens and embedded risk claims, which expired or were revoked upon anomaly detection. In lateral movement tests, micro-segmentation confined malicious traffic to single container pairs; SDP gateways logged and blocked 99% of unauthorized east-west flows. Even under policy tampering attempts—where attackers replayed stale policy snapshots—the mTLS channel and signed policy manifests prevented acceptance of any policy not verifiably signed by the central authority.

Resource overhead remained acceptable: average per-node CPU utilization during peak loads was 68.9%, compared to 60.3% baseline, and memory overhead for agent processes was under 5% of total RAM. Network effects peaked at 1.5 kB per inference request, an overhead dwarfed by typical model input sizes (100–200 kB). These results confirm that an edge-optimized

ZTA can be deployed on existing hardware without requiring specialized security accelerators.

RESULTS

The comprehensive simulation and statistical analysis demonstrate that our Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) for Edge-Native AI Inference Systems (ENAIS) delivers robust security enhancements while maintaining acceptable performance. Below, we detail key findings across multiple dimensions: access control efficacy, containment of compromised nodes, resilience under adverse conditions, and operational overhead.

Access Control Efficacy

Under the credential replay scenario—where attackers capture and attempt to reuse valid OAuth 2.0 tokens—the ZTA deployment blocked 98% of replay attempts, compared to just 32% in the baseline ACL-only system. This dramatic increase is attributable to two mechanisms: short-lived, risk-embedded tokens that expire quickly once anomalous behavior is detected, and mutual TLS (mTLS) session re-validation on each access request. Figure 3.1 illustrates the cumulative block rate over time, showing that within the first 500 unauthorized attempts, the ZTA blocked over 95% of them, whereas the baseline plateaued at approximately 35%. These results confirm that continuous authentication with dynamic risk scoring is highly effective at preventing credential misuse.

Lateral Movement Containment

In lateral movement tests—where a compromised node probes east-west interfaces to infiltrate adjacent pipeline components—the micro-segmentation enforced by a Software-Defined Perimeter (SDP) confined malicious traffic to isolated container pairs. Of the 1,000 lateral probes simulated across 10 runs, ZTA blocked 99.2% of unauthorized flows, while the baseline blocked only 28.5%. The SDP's policy manifests, digitally signed and versioned, prevented replay of stale or tampered rules,

ensuring that only up-to-date segmentations were honored. This containment strategy effectively prevents an attacker from moving beyond an initially compromised component, greatly reducing the blast radius of a breach.

Adaptive Policy Response

Continuous monitoring and analytics played a critical role in detecting anomalous behavior and triggering policy hardening. When the anomaly detection engine identified deviations in CPU usage patterns or unexpected system calls, it flagged the node's risk score, leading to immediate token revocation and micro-segmentation tightening. In our simulations, adaptive policy updates were propagated within an average of 120 ms—even under mesh topologies with intermittent link failures—ensuring real-time defense adjustments. Over 5,000 policy change events, 97% were successfully disseminated and enforced without requiring manual intervention, showcasing the architecture's self-healing potential.

Scalability and Policy Propagation

Scaling the simulation from 50 to 200 edge nodes—with a corresponding mesh network increase—resulted in a modest rise in average policy propagation delay to 180 ms. Block rates and latency overhead remained consistent, demonstrating linear scalability. This suggests that ZTA can be extended to large-scale deployments without exponential degradation in performance or security efficacy.

In sum, our results show that a well-tailored ZTA for ENAIS can:

- **Block over 98% of unauthorized access and lateral movement attempts**, compared to ~30% under traditional ACLs.
- **Enforce continuous, adaptive policies** with sub-200 ms propagation delays, even in mesh topologies.

- **Maintain real-time inference performance**, with latency increases well within acceptable bounds.
- **Operate reliably under intermittent connectivity**, preserving security during network partitions.
- **Scale linearly** to hundreds of nodes with minimal additional overhead.

These findings provide strong empirical support for adopting Zero Trust principles in edge AI inference scenarios, balancing stringent security with operational feasibility.

CONCLUSION

This study presents a first-of-its-kind Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) customized for Edge-Native AI Inference Systems (ENAIS), addressing the acute security challenges posed by decentralized, resource-constrained deployments. By integrating three core pillars—identity-centric access controls, micro-segmentation of inference pipelines, and continuous telemetry-driven policy adaptation—we demonstrate an architecture that effectively thwarts credential replay, lateral movement, and policy tampering, while preserving real-time performance.

Summary of Contributions

1. **Architectural Blueprint:** We defined a layered ZTA—combining OAuth 2.0/mTLS authentication, containerized SDP enforcement, and anomaly-driven risk scoring—that is both lightweight and extensible.
2. **Simulation-Based Validation:** Through extensive OMNeT++ simulations of 50–200 heterogeneous edge nodes, we quantified security metrics (98% block rates) and

performance impacts (16.6% latency increase, ~15% resource overhead).

3. **Adaptive Defenses:** The continuous monitoring framework proved effective in detecting and responding to anomalous behaviors in under 120 ms, enabling near real-time policy hardening without human intervention.
4. **Resilience & Scalability:** The design remained robust under intermittent connectivity and scaled linearly with network size, confirming practical deployability in large edge clusters.

Practical Implications

The proposed ZTA can be integrated into existing ENAIS deployments with minimal hardware upgrades. Organizations can leverage private PKI infrastructures to issue device certificates, deploy lightweight agents within inference containers, and utilize open-source telemetry platforms (e.g., MQTT, Prometheus) for analytics. Edge-AI vendors can embed the architecture into SDKs, enabling out-of-the-box Zero Trust capabilities.

Deployment Considerations

While simulation results are encouraging, real-world deployments must consider factors such as certificate lifecycle management, agent hardening against firmware attacks, and integration with heterogeneous orchestration platforms (e.g., Kubernetes-based edge clusters). Additionally, privacy implications of telemetry data collection should be addressed via data minimization and on-device aggregation.

Extensions to Federated Learning

Future work will explore how ZTA can secure federated learning workflows—where model updates, rather than raw data, traverse the network. Embedding policy checks at each training round and verifying gradient integrity can prevent compromised participants from poisoning global models.

Collaborative Threat Intelligence

Scaling Zero Trust across organizational boundaries—such as in consortiums of edge clusters—requires secure, federated exchange of threat intelligence. Designing trust frameworks for cross-domain policy sharing and anomaly correlation will be a critical next step.

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